The Lopsided Mode of Inquiry in Anthropology: An Identification of its Roots by khan, Umaira hussain
 International Journal of Sciences: 
Basic and Applied Research 
(IJSBAR) 
 
ISSN 2307-4531 
(Print & Online) 
 
http://gssrr.org/index.php?journal=JournalOfBasicAndApplied 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
230 
 
The Lopsided Mode of Inquiry in Anthropology: An 
Identification of its Roots 
Dr. Umaira hussain khan* 
Assistant Professor Department of Visual Studies University of Karachi 75270 Karachi, Pakistan 
Email: drumairahussain@gmail.com 
Abstract 
Social science has been an attempt to understand man and society in a scientific spirit. It was initially an 
adaptation of scientific method of inquiry but as it developed, its scope became limited. The discipline such as 
Anthropology designed and developed to understand that man does not provide with an exhaustive 
understanding but rather compromises to remain descriptive. The paper examines the mode of inquiry practiced 
in Anthropology and argues that the method of inquiry practiced in Anthropology is lopsided and has its roots in 
the philosophical doctrines of Idealism and Empiricism. It maintains that Idealism and Empiricism preferred 
observable reality as relevant and hence limited the scope of inquiry. With recent scientific advances in human 
understanding, it is increasingly becoming possible to take into account those aspects of reality which were 
thought unthinkable due to intangibility. This emerging shift in our understanding particularly about the 
universe and the working of human mind has made scientists think afresh. The paper suggests a correction by 
endorsing the use of speculation and reasoning as tools that can go beyond sense perception and limits of 
observation and can add into the objectives of social sciences. 
Keywords: Anthropology; Empiricism; Idealism; Intangibility; Social Science. 
1. Introduction 
What is wrong with the social sciences? There have been multiple answers to this question from scholars 
coming from a variety of disciplines and they seem to converge on the method of inquiry practiced in social 
sciences. 
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For instance, Roberto Unger, a renowned philosopher and politician pointed out that ‘the fundamental problem 
with the social sciences today is that they have severed the link between insight into what exists and imagination 
of what might exist at the next steps—the adjacent possible’[4]. This view certainly refers to the method of 
inquiry in social sciences and it informs that there is something seriously inadequate about it. The social 
scientist is not interested in the consequence and causation; he is missing out on the temporal dimension of 
reality. This negligence has its roots in philosophical doctrines of empiricism and idealism. The following 
exposition identifies the lopsided mode of inquiry in Anthropology and traces its ideological roots and suggests 
a possible correction in method.  
2. The Problem with the Method 
The famous Butterfly effect in the theory of Chaos seems to stand true regarding the history of the modes and 
methods of inquiry. According to the metaphor, a small disturbance initiated by a gentle movement of butterfly, 
at one side, can cause a hurricane at the other side of the world by magnifying itself through its unchecked 
course of amplification. We can notice the butterfly effect in the operation of computer viruses, where a 
computer virus carrying a message of “copy me” affects the entire information architecture in the hard drive and 
eventually corrupts all of the data. Similarly, a mistaken philosophical assumption through its unexamined 
course of usage can act like a computer virus. It acquires a status of fundamental postulate, it envelops a 
message of “copy me” and becomes a default position of different disciplines of knowledge. With the span of 
time, it gives rise to an intellectual chaos and absurd conclusions. It digress human beings from their potential to 
seek the true nature of things and processes at both micro and macro levels, and as its price, can magnify into a 
situation of conceptual confusion and purposelessness.  
In contemporary philosophy, we can see that this tendency has irrational consequences. For example, the moral 
individualism in existentialist philosophy, which is actually a gateway to anarchy, stresses that one must choose 
one’s own way without the aid of universal, objective standards. This suggestion is a consequence of a 
fundamental assumption emerged in empiricism that what is not perceivable is unknowable, which means that 
there is no scope of knowing an objective criterion of judgment, and thus the only criterion of judgment is 
subjective. The existentialist believes that we are trapped in existence and ‘everything in and about the world is 
totally arbitrary. There is no reason why it should be the way it is. There is no reason why we should accept one 
set of beliefs, or set of values, instead of any other’ [5: 390]. 
Most of the scholars in academia, in accordance with the modern empirical theory, now hold that our knowledge 
about reality is limited to the content of sense perception, i.e. experience. In Pragmatism, we find a middle ground 
between traditional metaphysics and irrationalism; we find a trial and error method for the verification of truth. 
The certitude of a doctrine depends upon the nature of consequences that it gives rise to, when practically applied. 
If the consequences are desirable then good enough, if undesirable then try another one. Its trial and error method 
attributes truth to a theory after its practical application. No one can inform a Nietzsche that your thinking is right 
or wrong unless it is verified and practically experienced in a Holocaust. Pragmatic method of attributing truth to 
a notion is a result of a failure, a failure to discover the truth through reason. It denies an objective standard of 
value and therefore promotes cultural relativism.  
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This cultural relativism suggested by Pragmatism has been influential in Anthropology. For example, Cultural 
Anthropologists declare every concept as a socio-cultural construct. This attitude of cultural relativism was 
inevitable because of a fundamental ignorance about logical criterion of judgment, which is discernable from 
Nature through the process of reasoning, but according to Empiricism and Kantian Idealism, it falls into the 
category of the unknowable, and therefore, it remained irrelevant for Anthropology and Pragmatism. The 
underline task of Cultural Anthropology is to understand different kinds of societies and their cultures to make 
sense of how people cope with life in today’s culturally diverse and complex world. Furthermore, 
Anthropologists can also help us to learn ways to meet the present day needs of people all over the world and to 
plan how we might live in the future. I am reminded here an interesting event, ‘Albert Einstein is reported to have 
said to Werner Heisenberg in Copenhagen in 1927 that it was wrong to believe a theory to be built on 
observations; it was quite the reverse: it is always a theory that determines what we can observe’ [1: 175]. To plan 
how we might live in the future is certainly pragmatic because any planning will need practical verification before 
it is considered to be the right one. Who knows then how many attempts will end up in failure and how many 
generations will remain confused and unhappy. The planning of Anthropologists will be based upon subjective 
criterion because reasoning is prohibited and objective reality is unknowable for both Anthropology and 
Pragmatism. An objective criterion replaces the word “might” with “should” not as a compulsion but as a logical 
necessity. 
Another school of thought that intersects with Anthropology is Logical Positivism. Bertrand Russell, G.E. Moore 
and Ludwig Wittgenstein are known as the founders of the twentieth century philosophical movement of Logical 
Positivism. It was Wittgenstein’s work that proved to be of decisive influence in the rejection of metaphysical 
doctrines for their meaninglessness and the acceptance of empiricism as logical necessity. Logical Positivism 
developed a principle of verification to find out the factual meaningfulness of a statement. ‘Although it can 
beindeed has beenformulated in many different ways, the essential idea behind it maintains that a statement 
has factual meaning if, and only if, it is empirically verifiable’ [5: 410]. The ultimate verification of a proposition 
indeed requires empirical evidence but it does not mean that we cannot go beyond our sense perception and we 
cannot know the truth before empirical evidence. For example, in General Relativity, when Einstein proposed that 
space is curved, there was no empirical evidence, neither it was perceivable through senses.  
By holding such view that we cannot know anything, which is not perceivable through the five-senses, they 
assume our capability of knowing and truth seeking, to be limited. This limitation also stands in Anthropology as 
a default position. Consequently, for an anthropologist theoretical physics, philosophy of metaphysics, Quantum 
mechanics, and human mind as a non-biological phenomenon are simply, irrelevant.  
Anthropology is fashioned in a method that was used in the political agendas of Colonialism. The Pragmatic 
stance of cultural relativism along with its baggage of empiricist default position seeped into this perspective. It 
includes Participant Observation in which an anthropologist lives in a specific culture and tries to capture the 
“Insider View” possessed by the natives of that culture. After and during his stay in a particular culture he piles 
up descriptive accounts called Ethnographies about the cultural values. 
Its descriptive stance of investigation is adequate to the extent we are dealing with natural beauty and 
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unchangeable circumstances. It is extensive and helpful to the extent to which we are dealing with stagnant art 
and stagnant cultures but it pathetically breaks down when we are seeking for a positive change in culture, when 
we are not impressed by cultures, when we are surrounded by misery and unproductive activity, when we are 
engraved in decadence and need a renaissance. When Karl Marx said, ‘Philosophers have interpreted the world in 
various ways, the point however is to change it [3], he was addressing the descriptive method of philosophy and 
endorsing the need for a change, he wanted a cure for the miserable condition of the people of his time, he 
required a consideration of temporal dimension. About anthropologists, Marx would have said, ‘Anthropologists 
have interpreted man in various ways, the point however is to change him.’ 
Observation is quite important if we use it as Newton used it. He tried to find out that why the apple fell on the 
ground. If Newton has been an Anthropologist, then instead of discovering the law of gravity, he would have said 
that apples at a certain time fall on the ground, and that’s all.   
3. Identification of Roots 
The basic function of theories and disciplines of knowledge is, first of all, to acquire knowledge, which 
inevitably needs a method of inquiry. In philosophy, epistemology is the branch that deals with the scope and 
validity of knowledge and plays a crucial role in determining the boundaries of inquiry. As a matter of fact, the 
method of inquiry determines the scope of inquiry but this equation is reversible. As efforts can never be more 
than the purpose, similarly, a method of inquiry cannot exceed the purpose of inquiry. The purpose of inquiry is 
the potential scope of inquiry.  
In German Idealism, the answer of the question, “how things exist in themselves?” is unknowable. Therefore, 
the purpose of German Idealism does not include an understanding of objective reality, and as far as its scope is 
concerned, it cannot provide an objective criterion of judgment and therefore leads to irrational subjectivity. In 
Empiricism, the sense data, which we experience in our minds, falls into the knowable and what is not 
perceivable through the senses is unknowable. In both cases we find a refutation of theoretical physics that deals 
with plank scale phenomena such as, curvature of space, quantum fluctuations and Higgs field, which are not 
observable even with highly sophisticated instruments. In addition, we find philosophical reasoning, 
unreasonable; the quest for Unified Field Theory, a wild goose chase; Nobel prizes in physics, appreciation of 
fiction; metaphysics, meaningless; and rationalist philosophy, a struggle to declare the intellect, impotent. 
Along with German Idealism, Empiricism is the philosophical basis of modern scientific method and various 
trends of modern philosophy, including Pragmatism, Existentialism, Phenomenology, and Logical Positivism. It 
also determines the scope of inquiry in Anthropology that shares its basic agendas with Pragmatism, by limiting 
it to the description of tangible aspects of reality. 
The fundamental doctrine that conditions both Empiricism and Anthropological perspective is certainly, 
philosophical Idealism. Empiricism itself is a modern version of philosophical idealism. The difference between 
Empiricism and Idealism is that the former attributes reality to perception and the latter to Idea. The epistemology 
of Anthropological approach is limited by the central postulate of empiricism that holds perception 
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(idea/impression) as reality and the unperceivable as unreal or otherwise unknowable. 
The method of inquiry that Anthropologists practice is an outcome of empirical theory of knowledge. To 
understand the anthropological research method and its limitation, it is valuable to analyze; why the empirical 
theory of knowledge holds this limitation? It is important to find out the roots that characterize its procedure.  
Historically, empiricism started as a movement in seventeenth century as an opposition to rationalism. John 
Locke (1632-1704), Bishop George Berkeley (1685-1753), and David Hume (1711-1776) were the 
representatives of empirical theory of knowledge. Rationalists held sense data as inadequate and dubious, and 
reason as most reliable source to acquire knowledge through the realization of innate ideas, whereas, empiricists 
denied the existence of innate ideas, minimized the role of reason, and held sense perception and experience as 
the most reliable source of acquiring knowledge.  
Rationalism failed to defend the primacy of reason because it defined reason as a tool to discover innate ideas, 
which was a mistake. John Locke identified this mistake, where he ‘dismissed as silly or nonsensical the 
rationalist view, which both Plato and Descartes held, that one can possess the innate truths without being aware 
of them. According to Locke, if we reflect on our experience we will find that our minds, at the outset, are void of 
all characters, our minds are blank slates’ [5: 62]. 
Locke dismissed the view but he took the function of reason for granted and never attempted to redefine it. 
However, rationalism proceeded simultaneously through Spinoza and Hegel but Empiricism remained the chief 
doctrine and an influential mainstream dogma, even for the twentieth century philosophy and contemporary 
schools of thought. 
In Locke’s theory of knowledge, we find a distinction between the properties of idea and the properties of the 
object about which the idea is established. This distinction does not appear as a necessary character of later 
empiricists but instead we see a tendency of immaterialism and subjective idealism. According to Locke, the 
properties that belonged to the object are referred as primary qualities such as size, shape, solidity and motion, 
whereas, secondary qualities are color, taste, smell, coldness and warmth. Locke also maintained that primary 
qualities force secondary qualities in sense experience and if we could see the world as it actually is, there would 
be only primary qualities. So, we can see that he is clearly distinguishing objective reality from subjective 
interpretation; even then, he says in his famous phrase, it is ‘a something, I know not what.’ 
In Berkeley’s philosophy, what is perceivable is knowable and what is not perceivable is unknowable. In addition 
to this Berkeley also denied the existence of external material reality and in his theory of immaterialism, held 
ideas and things identical. 
David Hume led inquiry to a dead end by the denial of external reality and complete skepticism about all notions 
and assumptions. He denied cause and effect as an objective relationship between processes and proposed that 
such relationships are subjective constructions and are consequences of psychological habits. According to him: 
We cannot justify what we believe. All that we can do is point out why we believe it, what habits and propensities 
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operate upon us. Fundamentally, our beliefs are irrational. They result not from rational thoughts or processes, but 
from psychological causes. We can point out that certain sets of beliefs are what we call “normal” or “reasonable” 
and others are not, but we cannot show that the former are the true ones…The madman may believe the exact 
opposite because his habits are different or deformed. But we cannot show that the beliefs of the “reasonable” 
man conform to the nature of things, while those of madman do not [5: 83].  
So, one can see the consequences of the butterfly effect. We cannot be certain about Hume’s own doctrine, since 
he can be a madman, according to his own point of view. Hume made sense information dubious and uncertain as 
the rationalists contended. In reaction to criticisms, many contemporary empiricists, especially the logical 
positivists, have defended some of Hume’s negative conclusions. They have pointed out that the limited and 
probable information gained by our senses, and organized by our habits and propensities, seems to be all that we 
actually “know,” and all that we need to “know.”  
In Immanuel Kant’s Idealism there is a distinction between the idea of a thing and the thing in itself but one 
cannot know the existence of things in them-selves. However, Kant formulated two categories of knowledge, 
which he called a priori (intuitive) and a posteriori (empirical) but it was only a modification of Berkeley’s 
concept of notions. It did not help out the limitation that he posed on truth seeking.  
One can see that in above-mentioned trends of thought, despite of their skeptic tendency, four assumptions are in 
front of us: 1. External reality does not exist; all that exists are ideas and perceptions, 2. If there is an external 
reality, it is unknowable and therefore irrelevant, 3. The only source of information is sense perception, 4. 
Intuition is another source of information in addition to sense perception. 
4. The Required Correction 
The issue of the existence of external material reality is not in question because with the advances in modern 
sciences, we know that Andromeda galaxy, supernovas, genes, subatomic particles, and Black holes do not exist 
as only percepts and ideas. Will Durant argue that ‘the idealist rightly believes that no tree would be green if no 
eye were there to see it; he wrongly supposes that his perception makes the greenness of the tree, if that were so, 
his perception would make all things green’ [6: 24]. 
We can know beyond sense information, in fact, we can know far beyond sense information. We also know that 
knowing a thing means knowing its properties. Some of the properties are perceivable through our external 
perceptual capabilities and some are not. For example, while playing chess, we weigh the potential chess moves 
against the potentially possible positions of the chessboard. We plan war strategy on the basis of information 
about the war field and the potential possibilities of enemy attack. Sometimes, our plan becomes fool proof. An 
experienced and clever chess player can plan to defeat a beginner. How one can think about a reality, which has 
not happened yet? It is neither a part of experience nor of perception. I think that one reason of such craft is the 
knowledge about the rules of chess but it cannot be the only reason because it is same in the case of opponent. 
The second reason is that in case of experienced chess player, his capability of weighing a potential move against 
the resultant potentially possible moves of the opponent and the potential positions of the chessboard is far greater 
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than his opponent. This experiential advantage and sensitivity about the higher order strategy is monitoring his 
imagination. The projections that he is making through imagination are ordered projections, ordered to the extent 
that he can encompass his opponent’s imagination or his opponent’s strategy. With enough competence 
difference, he can make the opponent to play in a manner, which is already a part of his own strategy. He can 
make such positions of the chessboard that he can force his opponent’s decision. This example has important 
implications regarding the role of intellect in drawing logical inferences about the nature of reality. 
To draw a logical inference or making a specialized speculation is similar to the projection of higher order 
strategic patterns in many respects. In the game of chess, an intelligent chess player has an intention to win the 
game; he knows the power of his chessmen that he can unleash in different situations. In the middle of the game 
his stock of information is: 
• Knowledge about the position of chessboard 
• Knowledge about the potential possibilities of chess moves regarding his chess men 
• A stock of specialized speculations about the resultant potential possibilities of the chessboard 
(dependent upon the opponent) after making a chess move 
It is in the third area where his experience plays the key role because in this area he is speculating about the 
outcomes. He is analyzing the possible outcomes by projecting them in his imagination and selecting them by the 
use of internal perceptual capabilities. According to John Sloboda: 
For a chess master, the mental representation of a chess position is not a copy of physical board. It is a more 
abstract structural description of the meaningful relationships between groups of pieces. Through many years of 
experience he has acquired automatic perceptual mechanisms, which rapidly pick out frequently occurring 
strategic patterns from the input. [2: 24]  
The usage of internal perceptual capabilities is in drawing logical inferences in the process of intellection. Internal 
perceptual capabilities provide us projections in the form of intuition and then we scrutinize these projections by 
the use of our verbal knowledge and intellection. To draw logical inferences means to engage the intellect in a 
higher order strategic pattern because the already established strategic patterns (philosophical doctrines) are not 
providing the right answers. We are dealing with the intangible, where we do not have knowledge, we can only 
speculate. We have the knowledge about the chessmen (the knowledge of things), we know the position of 
chessboard (the contemporary knowledge about macro processes or situation) and we are speculating about the 
resultant potential positions of the chessboard (possible relationships between the knowledge of things and the 
knowledge of situation). We judge our speculations on the basis of their consistency with the verified knowledge. 
Moreover, we weigh our speculations against the questions that are not well answered and the paradoxes that are 
not resolved. As the chess player, through his experience of playing chess, acquires automatic perceptual 
mechanisms that detect strategic patterns, similarly, a thinker in the course of thinking acquires such capabilities 
that his speculation does not defy discovered laws of Nature. When Einstein proposed that space is curved, he 
was trying to cast light on the nature of gravity, it was a projection of higher order strategic pattern.  
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5. Conclusion 
The basic premise for social sciences was the application of scientific method as it was practiced in natural 
sciences. But since the focus shifted from the study of things to study of man and society therefore two important 
additional areas came into play. One was the micro world of human mind, which due to its intangible nature fell 
outside the scope of inquiry that Anthropology inherited and the second was the macro evolutionary dynamic of 
Nature as a process, which involved an understanding of temporal dimension of reality including discoveries in 
Quantum Physics. Both the macro and micro affect man and society and both are no go areas for anthropology. In 
the light of modern scientific knowledge, we can understand objective reality and therefore the fundamental 
methodological position of anthropology coming from pre-scientific era needs to be revised. The present mode of 
inquiry in social sciences is cut off from the concrete need of man and society which is to be in sync with reality 
in all space and time. There is a need that social scientists must understand that limits of observation are not limits 
of inquiry and to understand man and society is not possible without understanding the micro and macro 
dimensions of reality. A true method of inquiry must be a synthesis of philosophy and natural science in which 
there should be a possibility to understand the intangible essence of things and the reality that is about to unfold. 
Unless such method and scope is adopted in social sciences, a meaningful integration of knowledge and our need 
to know is not possible. 
6. Limitation of Study 
The study has examined some of the source philosophical positions that limit the scope of anthropological 
methods such as ethnographic fieldwork, participant-observation, tacit dimension, interviewing, biography and 
life histories. However, it does not provide a holistic account of various approaches in Anthropology. It is 
certainly the case that in contemporary thinking and applications of the discipline, there are modifications that 
question the use of reason limited by the scope of observation. For instance, the study does not take into account 
positions that are categorized under Philosophical Anthropology.  
7. Recommendations 
The contemporary approaches in anthropology have shown a renewed interest in the use and application of 
abstract thinking and rationality going beyond sense perception. These modifications are not due to changes in the 
source paradigms but are a result of a greater accumulation of scientific knowledge fund that is endorsing rational 
philosophical positions of the past. These modifications should be analyzed in order to develop a knowledge base 
that could help revise the philosophical paradigms that has characterized the scope of inquiry in Anthropology. 
References 
[1] B. Poerksen. The Certainty of Uncertainty: Dialogues Introducing Constructivism. UK: Andrews UK 
Limited, 2013, p.175. 
[2] Johan A. Sloboda. 1986. The Musical Mind. [On line]. Available: 
http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198521280.001.0001/acprof-
International Journal of Sciences: Basic and Applied Research (IJSBAR) (2018) Volume 42, No  2, pp 230-238 
 
238 
 
9780198521280 [Mar. 28, 2016]. 
[3] M. Murphy. "What did Marx mean by Thesis Eleven? - Social Theory Applied." Internet: 
http://socialtheoryapplied.com/2013/08/10/what-did-marx-mean-by-thesis-eleven/, Oct. 8, 2013 [Mar. 
27, 2016]. 
[4] N. Warburton. "Roberto Unger on What is Wrong with the Social Sciences Today?" Internet: 
http://www.socialsciencespace.com/2014/01/roberto-mangabeira-unger-what-is-wrong-with-the-social-
sciences-today/, Sep. 1, 2014 [Mar. 27, 2016]. 
[5] R. H. Popkin & A. Stroll. Philosophy Made Simple (2 Revised Edition). New York: Three Rivers 
Press, 1993, pp. 62, 83, 390, 410. 
[6] W. Durant. The Story of Philosophy: The Lives and Opinions of the World’s Greatest Philosophers. 
New York: Pocket Books, 1991, p. 24. 
